By Clifford D. May
* * *
After a long week of slitting throats, smashing
antiquities and raping infidel slave girls, how do the Islamic State’s
barbarians unwind? Some, apparently, discuss the finer points of history.
An Islamic State billboard I recently came across (on the
Internet — not driving down the road to Raqqah, the Islamic State capital in
what used to be Syria) shows a rifle affixed to a compass (the kind used for
drawing arcs and measuring distances on maps), along with the inscription: “We
are the ones who determine our borders, not Sykes-Picot.”
The reference is to two dead, white, Christian males, Sir
Marc Sykes and Francois Georges-Picot, British and French diplomats,
respectively. They were the principle negotiators of the 1916 Sykes-Picot
Agreement that divided into nation-states Middle Eastern territories that for
centuries had been possessions of the Ottoman Empire and Sunni caliphate.
That treaty, leaders of the Islamic State (also known as
ISIS) believe, imposed upon the region an unjust political structure, one they
are using force of arms to deconstruct and replace with a new and improved
empire and caliphate.
I wonder: Where and when do Islamic State medievalists
talk about such topics? Do they organize discussion groups in homes, schools
and mosques? Perhaps they have book clubs. If so, I would recommend to them
“The Tail Wags the Dog: International Politics and the Middle East,” by Efraim
Karsh, professor emeritus at King’s College London, currently teaching at
Bar-Ilan University in Israel. In it, he makes the case that the conventional
wisdom is wrong: Europeans did not shape the modern Middle East to suit their
imperialist, colonialist or satanic interests.
He contends that Middle Eastern leaders and rulers “have
been active and enterprising free agents doggedly pursuing their national
interests and swaying the region pretty much in their desired direction, often
in disregard of great-power wishes.”
He adds: “External influences, however potent, have
played a secondary role, constituting neither the primary force behind the
region’s political development nor the main cause of its notorious volatility.”
Professor Karsh recalls what many choose to forget:
Imperialism and colonialism were by no means only European-Christian
institutions. Many of antiquity’s greatest imperial and colonial projects were
Middle Eastern/Muslim.
From the 13th century to the 20th, the Ottoman Empire
sought to conquer and expand — not least in Europe. Its collapse came about
when its sultan decided to enter what became known as World War I on what
turned out to be the losing side.
Even so, Mr. Karsh writes, Britain “remained wedded to
the Muslim empire’s continued existence, leaving it to a local Meccan potentate
— Sharif Hussein ibn Ali of the Hashemite family — to push for the idea of its
destruction.”
Mr. Karsh concludes that it was Sharif Hussein’s vision
that transformed the region: “The emirate of Transjordan (later to be known as
the Kingdom of Jordan) was established in 1921 to satisfy the ambitions of his
second son Abdullah, while in the same year the modern state of Iraq was
created at the instigation of Abdullah’s younger brother Faisal. Hussein
himself became King of the Hijaz, Islam’s birthplace, only to be evicted a few
years later by a fellow Arabian potentate, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, founding father
of Saudi Arabia.”
Over the years that followed, outsiders had minimal
impact on the region. Even after World War II, the United States and the Soviet
Union, despite their considerable military and economic muscle, found
themselves “powerless to contain undesirable regional developments” from the
fall of Iraq’s pro-Western Hashemite dynasty in 1958 to the Islamic revolution
in Iran in 1979.
Washington and Moscow “were forced to acquiesce in
actions with which they were in total disagreement.” Whatever successes other
foreign nations have had, Mr. Karsh argues, have been “largely due to the
convergence of their own wishes with indigenous trends.”
At present, of course, those trends are stunningly
savage. “The last great Muslim empire may have been destroyed and the caliphate
left vacant,” Mr. Karsh notes, “but the longing for unfettered suzerainty,
though tempered and qualified in different places and at different times, has
never disappeared, and has resurfaced in our day with a vengeance.”
The Islamic State, as well as such rivals as al Qaeda and
the Islamic Republic of Iran, seek to overturn not just Sykes-Picot but also
the broader Westphalian system of nation-states vowing to respect each others’
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
And not just in the Middle East. Mr. Karsh quotes Yusuf
Qaradawi, “a spiritual guide of the Muslim Brotherhood and one of today’s most
influential Islamic thinkers, whose views are promulgated to millions of
Muslims worldwide through the media and the Internet: ‘Islam will return to
Europe as a conqueror and victor.’“
The means to this end preferred by the Islamic State and
al Qaeda is jihad or, to use the phrase President Obama prefers, “violent
extremism.”
Iran is finding diplomacy useful: the deal recently
agreed to by Mr. Obama and the leaders of five other powers will provide the
clerical regime with funds, conventional arms and a path to nuclear weapons.
Other Islamists envision “a gradual takeover of Western societies through
demographic growth and steady conversion.” These approaches are not mutually
exclusive. More likely, they are more mutually reinforcing. One might even call
them components of a grand strategy.
Denizens of the Islamic State inspired by the message on
the billboard really should invite Mr. Karsh to join them for coffee and
baklava. In the unlikely event that happens, I’d advise him to send his
regrets. It’s not that they wouldn’t regard his historiography as cutting-edge.
It’s just that they may define that term a bit too literally.
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