Last Thursday, as the jury in the trial of Nidal Hasan
was deliberating, outgoing FBI Director Robert Mueller appeared on CBS News and
discussed a string of emails between the Fort Hood shooter and Anwar al-Awlaki,
a radical Islamic cleric with ties to the 9/11 hijackers. The FBI had
intercepted the messages starting almost a year before Hasan's 2009 shooting
rampage...
* AGAIN...
The FBI had intercepted the messages starting almost a
year before Hasan's 2009 shooting rampage...
...and Mueller was asked whether "the bureau dropped
the ball" by failing to act on this information.
Mueller didn't flinch: "No, I think, given the
context of the discussions and the situation that the agents and the analysts
were looking at, they took appropriate steps."
In the wake of the Fort Hood attacks, the exchanges
between Awlaki and Hasan — who was convicted of murder on Friday — were the
subject of intense speculation. But the public was given little information about
these messages. While officials claimed that they were "fairly
benign," the FBI blocked then-Sen. Joseph Lieberman's efforts to make them
public as part of a two-year congressional investigation into Fort Hood.
(*SMIRK*)
The military judge in the Hasan case also barred the
prosecutor from presenting them, saying they would cause "unfair
prejudice" and "undue delay."
(*JUST SHAKING MY HEAD*)
As it turns out, the FBI quietly released the emails in
an unclassified report on the shooting, which was produced by an investigative
commission headed by former FBI director William H. Webster last year. And, far
from being "benign," they offer a chilling glimpse into the psyche of
an Islamic radical.
(*PURSED LIPS*)
The report also shows how badly the FBI bungled its Hasan
investigation and suggests that the Army psychiatrist's deadly rampage could
have been prevented.
* HOW BADLY OBAMA'S FBI BUNGLED ITS HASAN
INVESTIGATION...
* HOW BADLY AMERIKA'S POST-9/11 FBI BUNGLED ITS HASAN
INVESTIGATION...
Hasan first appeared on the bureau's radar in December of
2008 — nearly a year before the Fort Hood massacre — when he emailed Awlaki...
* YOU FOLKS KNOW WHO AWLAKI IS... RIGHT?
(*SNORT*)
...to ask him whether serving in the U.S. military was
compatible with the Muslim faith. He also asked whether Awlaki considered those
who died attacking their fellow soldiers "shaheeds," or martyrs.
At the time, Awlaki (who was [assassinated] by a U.S.
drone strike in 2011) was emerging as Al Qaeda's chief English-speaking
propagandist. He was also known to have ties to several of the 9/11 hijackers,
two of whom attended his mosque in San Diego.
The FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force in San Diego, which
was tracking Awlaki, intercepted Hasan's December email, along with another
sent in January. A search of the Pentagon's personnel database turned up a man
named Nidal Hasan who was on active military duty and was listed as a
"Comm Officer" at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, DC.
Normally, when the FBI unearths this kind of raw
intelligence, it issues an Intelligence Information Report (IIR) - which is
shared with law enforcement agencies and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(This system was designed to prevent the kind of
information bottlenecks that allowed the 9/11 plot to go undetected.)
But the San Diego agents misinterpreted the "Comm
Officer" label in Hasan's file to mean "communications officer"
(in fact, it meant "commissioned officer") and believed that a person
in this role might have access to IIRs. To avoid tipping him off, they skipped
the report and sent a detailed memo requesting an investigation directly to the
Washington, DC, Joint Terrorism Task Force, a multiagency team overseen by the
FBI that investigates terrorism cases in the capital. The message noted that
Hasan's "contact with [Awlaki] would be of concern if the writer is
actually the individual identified above."
The file languished for nearly two months...
(*SIGH*)
...before it was assigned to an agent for the Defense
Criminal Investigative Services, who was on the task force.
(According to a 2011 report on the Fort Hood shootings by
the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, DCIS — a law
enforcement agency within the Pentagon, which normally deals with fraud and
cybercrime among military personnel and contractors — was ill-equipped to tackle
a counterterrorism investigation.)
(*CLAP...CLAP...CLAP*)
Meanwhile, Hasan kept writing Awlaki.
Between January and May 2009, Hasan sent the radical
cleric more than a dozen emails, and received two relatively benign responses.
In one message, ostensibly about Palestinians firing unguided rockets into
Israel, Hasan asked Awlaki whether "indiscriminately killing
civilians" was acceptable. Two days later, he sent another message
answering his own question: "Hamas and the Muslims hate to hurt the
innocent but they have no choice if they're going to have a chance to survive,
flourish, and deter the Zionist enemy. The recompense for an evil is an
evil."
The San Diego field office intercepted these missives,
too. But the database where the FBI stored intercepted emails didn't automatically
link messages from the same sender, so the staff didn't realize that Hasan's
early 2009 emails were from the person who had set off alarms the previous
December.
* AGAIN, FOLKS... OUR POST-9/11 INTELLIGENCE SERVICES...
"COORDINATED" UNDER A DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY WHO REPORTS
DIRECTLY TO OBAMA... INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WHICH INCLUDE THE FBI, CIA, NSA...
THE WHOLE ALPHABET UNDER "HOMELAND SECURITY"... AND OF COURSE THE
VARIOUS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY POLICE FORCES... AND ON AND ON AND
ON.
Meanwhile, the Washington-based DCIS agent assigned to
investigate Hasan put off his inquiry for another 90 days, the maximum allowed
under joint task force rules, before conducting a cursory investigation. Over
the course of four hours on May 27, 2009, he ran Hasan's name through several
databases to see if the psychiatrist had been targeted in previous
counterterrorism probes. He also reviewed Hasan's Pentagon personnel file.
Hasan's officer evaluations were mostly positive, and the chair of psychiatry
at Walter Reed had written that Hasan's research on Islamic beliefs regarding
military service had "extraordinary potential to inform national policy
and military strategy."
* WORTH REPEATING:
Hasan's officer evaluations were mostly positive...
* WORTH REPEATING:
...and the chair of psychiatry at Walter Reed had written
that Hasan's research on Islamic beliefs regarding military service had
"extraordinary potential to inform national policy and military
strategy."
* UH... HUH...
The Senate investigation later found these reports
"bore no resemblance to the real Hasan, a barely competent psychiatrist
whose radicalization toward violent Islamist extremism alarmed his colleagues
and his superiors."
* SO... THIS IS "THE SYSTEM" THAT MANY OF YOU
"DON'T MIND INVESTIGATNG YOU" BECAUSE "YOU'VE DONE NOTHING
WRONG... YOU HAVE NOTHING TO HIDE." UH... MORONS AMONG YOU... HOW'BOUT IF
WHAT'S IN YOUR FILE "BEARS NO RESEMBLANCE TO THE REAL YOU?" HMM? YOU...
THE MORONS AMONG YOU AT LEAST... WANT TO SURRENDER YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL
LIBERTIES TO THESE CLOWNS?
(*SNORT*)
Nevertheless, the DCIS investigator concluded, based on
Hasan's file, that the Army psychiatrist had contacted Awlaki in connection
with his academic research and "was not involved in terrorist activity."
(*SILENCE*)
* QUESTION: WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THIS
"INVESTIGATOR?"
The DCIS investigator and a supervisory agent in the
Washington field office debated interviewing Hasan or his superiors. They
ultimately decided doing so could jeopardize the Awlaki investigation or harm
Hasan's career.
* QUESTION: WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THIS "SUPERVISORY
AGENT?"
* IS THERE ANY PRICE TO BE PAID FOR UTTER INCOMPETENCE
THAT GETS PEOPLE KILLED? (RHETORICAL QUESTION... THINK BENGHAZI.)
Advocates for Fort Hood victims find this decision
puzzling. "A US Army major is writing to this imam and essentially asking
for religious sanction to kill American soldiers," said attorney Reed
Rubinstein, who represents a group of victims who are suing the federal government.
"And the FBI's Washington field office doesn't even interview the man or
make a phone call to his superiors. It's utterly incomprehensible."
(*PURSED LIPS*)
In May 2009, around the time the Washington field office
wrapped up its Hasan investigation, Hasan's emails to Awlaki took an ominous
turn. In one message, he said he had "heard a speaker defending suicide
bombings as permissible" and laid out the speaker's rationale: For
example, he reported a recent incident were an American Soldier jumped on a
grenade that was thrown at a group of soldiers. In doing so he saved 7 soldiers
but killed himself…So, he says this proves that suicide is permissible in this
example because he is a hero. Then he compares this to a soldier who sneaks
into an enemy camp during dinner and detonates his suicide vest to prevent an
attack that is known to be planned [for] the following day. Hasan made the case
that the second act was as heroic as the first.
He then delved into the question of "'collateral
damage' where a decision is made to allow the killing of innocents for a
valuable target." "I would assume that suicide bomber whose aim is to
kill enemy soldiers or their helpers but also kill innocents in the process is
acceptable," he wrote.
An FBI agent in the San Diego field office, whom the
Webster report identifies as "SD-Agent," reviewed this email, but
again failed to link it to the Hasan case.
He ultimately determined it was "Not a Product of
Interest."
On June 11, the same agent read the Washington task
force's report on the Hasan investigation. While he still didn't connect the
dots with the message he read, the agent was dismayed that the investigation
hadn't gone deeper and considered the justification for not interviewing Hasan
"weak excuses." His colleagues in San Diego agreed. In fact,
according to the Webster Commission, one of them believed Hasan must have been a
confidential source — why else would the Washington office conduct such a
perfunctory investigation?
* Er... PERHAPS BECAUSE THE WASHINGTON OFFICE WAS/IS
STAFFED BY TOTAL INCOMPETENTS? (JUST A THOUGHT...)
At this point, SD-Agent asked the DCIS investigator on
his team to press his Washington counterpart to dig deeper, after which the San
Diego DCIS agent sent Washington an email asking why the investigation was so
"slim." In a follow-up phone call, he explained that San Diego would
have at least interviewed Hasan.
* WAIT FOR IT... WAIT FOR IT...
(*DRUM ROLL*)
According to the Webster Commission, the Washington DCIS
agent dismissed these concerns, saying the Washington field office
"doesn't go out and interview every Muslim guy who visits extremist
websites" and stressing that the subject was "politically
sensitive." (The Webster report notes that the quotes are not verbatim).
The chair of the Senate Homeland Security Committee
faulted the FBI and the Pentagon for failing to act on information that
"with the clarity of hindsight just shouts out, 'Stop this guy before he
kills somebody!'"
* WOW... "FAULTED..."
(*SHAKING MY HEAD; SPITTING ON THE GROUND*)
According to the FBI's policy for resolving inter-office
investigative disputes, at this point the San Diego field office should have
communicated its concerns up the chain of command. But that didn't happen.
What's more, none of the FBI agents involved thought to query the bureau's
database of intercepted electronic communications. Had they done so, the
Webster Commission found, they would have uncovered other emails that
"undermined the assumption" that Hasan had contacted Awlaki
"simply to research Islam."
(*JUST SHAKING MY HEAD*)
Within days of the mid-June confrontation between San
Diego and Washington, Hasan was transferred to Fort Hood, Texas, where he
counseled soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan — and bought a
semi-automatic armor-piecing pistol.
That October, he received word that he would be deploying
to Afghanistan, but that never happened. On November 5, Hasan marched into a
deployment processing center at Fort Hood and opened fire, killing 13 people — including
a pregnant soldier, who curled up on the floor and pled, "My baby! My
baby!" — before the Army psychiatrist was shot and paralyzed. According to
the congressional investigation, SD-Agent immediately pegged Hasan as the
culprit. "You know who that is?" he asked one of his analysts.
"That's our boy."
Reports of Hasan's contact with Awlaki quickly surfaced
in the media, but the contents of the emails were not made public.
On November 8, 2009, the Senate Homeland Security and
Government Affairs Committee launched its investigation. According to a former
Senate staffer who was involved in the inquiry, the committee struggled to get
information from the FBI, which was reluctant to hand over the Awlaki emails
and refused to let congressional investigators interview the agents involved.
"The FBI insisted that it would have a chilling effect on the people
making front-line decisions if they had to worry constantly about Congress
calling them in to explain their actions," the staffer said.
* FOLKS... UNDERSTAND... IN 2009 DEMOCRATS STILL
CONTROLLED BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS! (THEY CONTROL THE SENATE TO THIS VERY DAY!)
OBAMA'S EXECUTIVE AGENCY REPORTEES WOULDN'T EVEN COOPERATE WITH A
DEMOCRAT-CONTROLLED LEGISLATIVE BRANCH... THE "OVERSIGHT" BRANCH!
The bureau eventually agreed to let congressional
investigators review the emails, but only inside a secure facility. They
weren't allowed to copy the messages or write about them on computers that were
connected to the internet, much less discuss them in their final report.
Nevertheless, when he presented the committee's findings in February 2011,
then-Sen. Lieberman faulted the FBI and the Pentagon for failing to act on
information that, "with the clarity of hindsight just shouts out, 'Stop
this guy before he kills somebody!'"
* "FAULTING" THESE INCOMPETENT BASTARDS ISN'T
ENOUGH - NOT BY A LONG SHOT! THESE INCOMPETENT BASTARDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN FIRED!
In July 2012, the Webster Commission released its report,
but the document went largely unnoticed.
* THANK GOD FOR MOTHER JONES!
Besides describing the FBI's missteps in the Hasan case,
the report delved into the underlying institutional problems — including
shortcomings in the bureau's training, information-sharing, and
intelligence-gathering policies — and proposed a series of reform
recommendations.
* WASN'T THERE A 9/11 COMMITTEE - AND OTHER COMMITTEES -
WHICH SUPPOSEDLY "REFORMED" THE SYSTEM LONG PRIOR TO 2009?
The FBI declined to comment for this story, but it issued
a statement saying that it "concurs with the principles underlying all the
recommendations and has already taken action to implement them."
Many of the issues in the Hasan case — particularly the
breakdown in interagency communication — are reminiscent of the intelligence
failures prior to the 9/11 attacks.
* UH... YEAH!
One member of the Webster Commission told Mother Jones
that the problems with information sharing have actually grown worse since 9/11
because of "the information explosion."
* I HAVE NO DOUBT!
"Every year the amount of data is doubling," he
said. "The sheer amount of information that might result from legitimate
surveillance — or, in a criminal context, a legitimate wiretap — is mind
boggling compared to what it was 10 years ago." He added that the FBI in
particular has struggled to manage the surge in intelligence data, as its focus
has shifted to counterterrorism, which wasn't central to its mission before
9/11.
On Friday, a panel of senior military officers found
Hasan guilty of 13 counts of murder. This week, they'll decide whether to give
him death or a life sentence. But the final verdict on the FBI's actions has
yet to be delivered.
A group of more than 100 Fort Hood victims and victims'
relatives has filed suit claiming that the government's "gross
negligence" and "reckless disregard" for the lives of Fort Hood
residents and staff paved the way for the tragedy. "The attack should not
have happened," says Lisa Bahr Pfund, whose daughter, a Fort Hood victim and
a plaintiff in the case, took a bullet to the back and suffers from pain so
severe that she can't sit for more than a half hour at a stretch. "It
would not have happened if that information was handled properly."
The damning paper trail laid out in the Webster
report should give the plaintiffs ample ammunition.
